筆記_奥斯特罗姆：制度分析与发展框架的背景

Gaming institution design

Justification of DAO: Using IAD Framework and Cybernetics Theory

1. Network as a public good 1.1. the nature of platform

• Platform including search engine and social media constructs an essential part of citizen's oniine civic participation in the digital space, which can be classifed as public goods due to its nonexcludable and nonrivalrous nature. The tradegy of common goods seems unaviodable if we assume all the agents in the space are completely rational and self-interest orientated- similar to physical world, only difference the resource here is attention rather than a real existence. 1.2 the common tradegy in digital space
  • malicious content
  • engagement-based algorithm
  • attention-mining 1.3 section 230: waterloo of centralized governance strucuture [[Section 230]]

1. justification of the automomous and decentralized goverrnance

   2.1. cybernetic system, viable system model and intelligent organization (trust)

   • [[The intelligent Organization- Stafford Beer]]
   • [[Note_DAO and cybernetic 筆記_将 DAO与控制论的先例联系起来]] 2.2. Applying IAD framework to validify the decentralized system
   • [[Elinor Ostrom Nobel Lecture]]
   • [[Note_ Beyond Markets and States Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems]] 2.3. metagovernance: modular politics [[Note_Modular Politics_ Toward a Governance Layer for OnlineCommunities]]

2. observational report: meta analysis of DAO practice and gamification of governance

   3.1. impact DAO

   • https://daocollective.xyz/articles/solving-the-riddle-of-the-dao-with-colorados-cooperative-laws/
   • Impact DAO 5 classification and 16 types https://impactdaos.xyz/posts/5-types-of-impact-daos

   3.2. DAO standardize- ERC4824 - the API of governance layer 3.3 gamification of community governance

   • tOwns (cityDAO)
   • modpol (practice of modular politics)

behavior: self-govern, exit, reporosity

reflection (self_note)

• 当前在很多领域 市场/政府 机制的失灵
  • example in SoP:
    • 电子邮件服务中的集中效应
    • 毁林监测- 气候行动是协议设计最困难的领域之一
    • 互联网协议中的IPv6
    • 全球塑料回收
    • 区块链终局
  • I bid:
    • LLM / AI-automated-governance（should be)
    • Network. social media
  • 政府/市场 框架无法解决的问题通常具备的特点
    • 政府有限了解（不具备最前沿的视角— Elinor: 农民在耕地资源分配决定里的关键）
      • 永远慈祥的独裁者理论
      • 利维坦
    • 可以市场提供 -但会导致严重的负外部性 （阻碍社会协作和进一步发展）
  • 关于公地悲剧：已有解决方法（对比研究）
  • Elinor: “第五种”博弈设计，基于共识的惩罚机制会让背叛导致个人利益的损失 （博弈的不合理充分性）
  • 沟通（vibe-checking, culture and sense): 信任在直觉上的延伸
  • 激进市场：动摇'私有产权‘的根基，资源自动流入最有使用效率的团体
  • 区块链作为一种信任机器，AI的兴起与人机交互
    • 区块链本身技术
      • 透明：完全信息
      • 基于共识（51%）
      • 不可删除且难以垄断：去中心化
    • 协议层
      • 开发标准 （协调与标准化）
    • 智能合约
      • 原子化的博弈设计
    • DAO作为一种新的治理结构
      • DAO本质上就是一种将博弈机制设计进智能合约的组织，围绕一个目的和一种资源，一群人会‘自发’ 或者‘有组织’的聚集，为了更好的管理资源，建立信任，在DAO内部机制建立合作为导向的关系。DAO核心的drive是给予共识的一系列智能合约（算法管理的电子化的社会合约) - 包括成立之初的宪法，以及之后的修正案。
      • 如何保证基于共识？
        • 投票机制设计：
          • 一人一票
          • 一元一票
          • 二次方投票（UBI 基础上的复合型设计）
          • 可追溯性投票 （类似于inverse probabilty weighting)
            • DAO member 成功做出 对DAO 有long-term benefit 会得到更多的投票权重）
      • DAO 与DAO 的齿轮机制
        • DAO standard
        • 数据标准 - API 接口 （ERC 4824）
    • 机器学习与大型语言模型的突破性进展（大众普及+ 商业化层面）
      • 人对于服从AI指令的直觉性倾向上升
      • 博弈机制 （AI and people)
      • 传统世界的权力转移与倾斜加速
        • 掌握最先进AI技术的主权国家（如美国）和其他主权国家之间 （info is everything, this should be nuclear power in new-era)
          • Sam Altman 的 worldcoin 首先针对国家是非洲
            • 隐私问题，隐形社会契约：‘多余’的资源分配主动权 -- 弱势地位国家的话语权
        • 掌握AI技术的科技巨头和主权国家
        • 网络国家的实验
        • AI 和它的‘造物主’
          • 人本主义的黄昏
          • 奇点来临
          • AGI and AI alignment

未来治理结构的变革方向

• smart contract (atom)
• protocol (standard)
• DAO (org)
• MetaGov (DAO-2-DAO)
• alternative trend - AI govern

One example from Ostrom's work is the management of fisheries. In an open-access fishery, fishers might act in their own self-interest by catching as many fish as they can, without considering the impact on the fish population. This overfishing can lead to a decline in fish stocks and eventually the collapse of the fishery, which is detrimental to the livelihoods of fishers and the sustainability of the ecosystem.

The dichotomy between markets and government has long been considered the optimal structure for managing resources. Markets excel at producing and exchanging private goods, while a single government department is believed to provide public goods most efficiently. This perspective posits that a hierarchical government is necessary for guiding citizens and officials towards the efficient production of public goods, such as peace and security. However, this binary approach fails to account for the complex dynamics within private enterprises and the diverse range of institutional arrangements that humans use to manage public goods and common-pool resources.

Traditional solutions have encountered challenges in addressing issues that the government/market framework is ill-equipped to handle. One such challenge is the limited understanding of governments in certain situations, such as farmers' decision-making processes regarding arable land allocation. Additionally, market-provided solutions can lead to severe negative externalities that hinder social collaboration and further development. As a result, alternative approaches have been explored to better address these shortcomings.